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STATE OF UTAH 




RICHARD A. BROWN and JACQUELINE 
A. BROWN, partners, dba B & C COM-
P ANY, a partnership, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11,601 
Suite for replevin of motor vehicles held by Defend-
ants on trust receipt and counterclaim for usury, funds 
due for purchase of an automobile, for an accounting, 
breach of contract, etc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Court on its own motion diismissed the complaint and 
counterclaim for failure of both parties to prosecute the 
action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an order vacating the order dismissing 
the counterclaim and permitting it to proceed to trial. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The sequence of events involving this matter are as 
follows: 
7-22-63 Plaintiff filed complaint (R. 2) 
8-21-63 Defendants filed answer and counterclaim 
(R. 19) 
8-30-63 Plaintiff filed motion to strike counterclaim 
(R. 20) 
1-13-69 Defendant filed notice of readiness for trial 
(R. 28) 
1-20-69 Plaintiff filed objections to notice of read-
iness for trial (R. 22) 
3-10-69 Plaintiff filed motion to strike defenses 
(R. 24) 
3-10-69 Plaintiff filed amended motion to strike 
counterclaim (R. 25) 
3-10-69 Plaintiff filed notice of hearing of their 
pending motions (R. 27) 
3-18-69 Order of dismissal by court (R. 29) 
No action was taken by either party for 51;2 years after 
filing of complaint, answer and counterclaim and motion 
to strike. After 5% years Defendant requested that the 
case be set for trial by filing a notice of readiness for 
trial (R.28). Plaintiff then filed an objection (R. 22) but 
has never called its objection up for hearing. Two months 
later Plaintiff filed additional motions and called them 
up for hearing (R. 24, 25, 27). Neither party made a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and each party 
was proceeding to a determination of the issues on the 
merits when the Court, at the time set for hearing those 
motions without notice to either party, with the consent 
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of Plaintiff and over the objections of Defendants, or-
dered the complaint and counterclaim dismissed for 
failure to prosecute (R. 29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTER-
CLAIM FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION. 
The sole issue to be determined by this appeal is 
whether the Court erred in dismissing the counterclaim 
under the circumstances. 
(a) Plaintiff's motion in open court to dismiss its 
complaint and Defendants' counterclaim did not au-
thorize court to dismiss the counterclaim. 
Plaintiff's motion in open court for the dismissal of 
Plaintiff's complaint (R. 29), after the court had indi-
cated that it was going to dismiss the action for failure to 
prosecute, did not authorize the Court to dismiss the 
action because a counterclaim had been filed and Defend-
ants did not consent. The only circumstance under which 
Plaintiff's complaint could be dismissed on Plaintiffs 
tion would be when, as stated in the rule, the counter-
claim can remain pending for independent adjudication 
by the court. The Court could properly dismiss Plaintiff's 
complaint only if the counterclaim were not dismissed. 
Rule 41 (a) (1) and (2), URCP; Watson v. White, case 
No. 11321 filed June 18, 1969, U (2d) __ 
P. 2d __ 
(b) Rule 41 authorizes the Court to dismiss a count.:. 
erclaim on motion of the Plaintiff only if counter-
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claim may remain pending for independent adjudi-
cation. 
Rule 41 ( b), URCP specifies the circumstances under 
which an action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute, 
which rule reads in part as follows: 
Rule 41(b) INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT 
THEREOF. 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ... a defend-
ant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against him .... " 
Rule 41 (a) and (b) is made applicable to counterclaims 
by Rule 41 ( c), URCP. See also Crystal Lime & Cement 
v. Golden W. Robbins, et al., 8 U (2d) 389, 335 P.2d 624. 
The Court is not authorized by rule 41 to dismiss an 
action on its own motion, but only on motion by the de-
fendant. In Watson v. White, Supra the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed an order of the Fifth District Court dis-
missing a complaint and an answer and counterclaim 
filed 5 2/3 years later. In that case no action whatever 
was taken by the Defendant in that action until 5 2/3 
years after the action had been commenced, which is a 
period slightly in excess of the dormant period involved 
in this action. The Court in that case construed the phrase 
contained in Rule 41 (a) (2), URCP which states that the 
dismissal may only be had "upon such terms and con-
ditions as the court deems proper" to mean that a dis-
missal cannot be granted unless the defendants are pro-
tected by permitting their counterclaim to remain for 
independent adjudication. The Court in that case, as in 
our case, did not have a discretion to exercise under the 
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terms of that rule which permitted it to order the dismis-
sal of the counterclaim, reversed the order of dismissal 
and remanded the case for further proceedings by the 
lower court. This case seems to fall squarely within the 
rule established by that decision that no discretion existed 
in favor of the Court to dismiss the counterclaim. See 
also Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Vol 2B quoted with approval by the Court in that case. 
( c) Dismissal for failure to prosecute is not author-
ized where a counterclaim has been filed and both 
parties had the power to take action to obtain relief 
themselves. 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Golden W. Robbins, 
supra, which, as in our case, involved a counterclaim and 
therefore subjected both parties to the penalty of dis-
missal of their action for failure to prosecute. This Court 
ruled that it was error for the district court to dismiss the 
action with prejudice as to a party who failed to take 
action for 8 years since both plaintiff and defendant had 
the power to obtain relief following a decree of the Su-
preme Court. In our case the delay was 21/2 years less 
than that in the Crystal Lime & Cement v. Robbins, supra, 
case, and as in that case either the plaintiff or defendant 
could have called Plaintiff's motion up for hearing by 
mailing of notice to the other party. In that case the Court 
stated 
"Since any party to this action could have obtained 
the relief to which it was entitled at any time it had 
wanted but both parties chose to dally for a number 
of years, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to 
1 grant respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice." 
e (Emphasis added). 
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(d) A party is not harassed or annoyed by failure to 
prosecute when it had power at all times to take ac-
tion to obtain relief themselves. 
A reason generally advanced for dismissal of an action 
for failure to prosecute is that to permit the case to re-
main pending indefinitely would result in undue har-
rassment and annoyance of the defendant. 24 Am Jur 2d 
50, Sec. 59; Barron & Holtzoff, Vol. 2B, page 139, Sec. 918. 
That rule is not applicable however where the parties 
are equally at fault. Barron & Holtzoff, Vol. 2B, page 144, 
Sec. 918 footnote 13; 24 Am. Jur. 2d 57, Sec. 66, footnote 
3; In Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. Robbins, Supra, 
the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted this excep-
tion to the general rule permitting dismissal for failure 
to prosecute by the following ruling in that case: 
"It can, therefore, hardly be reasonably argued that 
they were harassed and annoyed by appellant's action 
in failing to draw and present to the court findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and decree embodying the 
decision of the court granting them the amounts they 
claim when they had it in their power at all times to 
obtain relief by themselves presenting such findings 
and decree to the court for signing." (emphasis 
added) 
In Wright v. Howe, 46 U. 588, 150 P. 956 the Utah Su-
preme Court held that in the absence of showing of any 
prejudice, a defendant who had the same right as the 
plaintiff to press the action to trial, but who permitted it 
to remain pending for about three years could not com-
plain of the overruling of their motion to dismiss the ac-
tion for failure to prosecute. 
In Lyon v. State, 283 P.2d 1105, 76 Idaho 374, the Court 
refused to dismiss where the plaintiff moved for the 
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cause to be reinstated after it had been inactive for over 
eleven years in which case it did not appear that the 
defendants had lost any rights, or had been prejudiced 
by the delay, or that plaintiffs had unreservedly aban-
doned the action, delay in prosecution alone not entitling 
the defendants to summary dismissal over objection. 
The record in our case fails to show that the plaintiff 
has lost any rights or has been prejudiced by the delay 
in prosecution of this action, and the filing of the notice 
of readiness for trial by Defendants two months before 
the first action was taken by the court to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute, clearly shows that the Defendants 
had not abandoned their counterclaim. 
In our case the Plaintiff at all times had it within its 
power to obtain relief by simply noticing up their own 
motion for hearing. 
( e) Earlier de lay does not justify dismissal when 
party is prosecuting action with diligence at time of 
dismissal. 
In our case the parties had resumed active prosecution 
of the case some two months prior to the first indication 
by the Court that the case should be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. An action cannot be dismissed at a time 
when the parties are prosecuting the case with diligence 
because at some earlier time the plaintiff failed to act 
with diligence. Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Vol. 2B, Page 140, Sec. 918; Rollins v. U. S., 
C.A.9th, 1961, 286 F. 2d 761; 24 Am. Jur. 51, Sec. 59; 
Ayers v. D. F. Quillen & Sons, Inc., (Del. Sup) 188 A2d 
510; 
(f) Drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice 
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should be applied only in extreme cases. 
Dismissal of an action with prejudice is a drastic rem-
edy which should be applied only in extreme cases, and 
in final analysis the court has the responsibility of doing 1 
justice and general principles cannot justify denial of 
party's fair day in court except on serious showing of 
willful fault. Mely v. Morris, (Alaska), 409 P.2d 979; 
Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 
733 (2d Cir. 1960); Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba ' 
v. PRC Pictures, 2 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 93, 96; Gill v. 
Stolow, 2 Cir, 1957, 240 W.2d 669, 670; 2B Barron & Holt-
zoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 917, at 136. 
SUMMARY 
The Court abused its discretion by dismissing Defend-
ants' counterclaim on its own motion, over their objec· 
tions for failure to prosecute where, although case had 
been dormant for 5% years. Defendant had 21/2 months 
earlier filed a notice of readiness for trial asking that the 
case be set for trial. Where both parties had equal power 
to call Plaintiff's pending motion up for hearing, Plaintiff 
filed no motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and 
there is no showing that Plaintiff lost any right or had 
been prejudiced by the delay, and the long pending mo-
tions had been called up for hearing by the parties and 
were about to be heard by the Court when the Court 
ordered the case dismissed without notice to the parties. , 
Rule 41 pertaining to dismissal of actions does not au-
thorize this dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants 
